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Abstract
Exchange of information on and sharing of influenza viruses through the GISRS network has great 
significance for understanding influenza virus evolution, recognition of a new pandemic virus 
emergence and for preparing annual WHO recommendations on influenza vaccine strain 
composition. Influenza surveillance in Russia is based on collaboration of two NICs with 59 
Regional Bases. Most epidemiological and laboratory data are entered through the internet into the 
electronic database at the Research Institute of Influenza (RII), where they are analyzed and then 
reported to the Ministry of Public Health of Russia. Simultaneously, data are introduced into 
WHO’s Flu Net and Euro Flu, both electronic databases. Annual influenza epidemics of moderate 
intensity were registered during four pre-pandemic seasons. Children aged 0–2 and 3–6 years were 
the most affected groups of the population. Influenza registered clinically among hospitalized 
patients with respiratory infections for the whole epidemic period varied between 1.3 and 5.4% 
and up but to 18.5–23.0% during the peak of the two pandemic waves caused by influenza 
A(H1N1) pdm 09 virus and to lesser extent (2.9 to 8.5%) during usual seasonal epidemics. Most 
epidemics were associated with influenza A(H1N1), A(H3N2) and B co-circulation. During the 
two pandemic waves (in 2009–2010 and 2010–2011) influenza A(H1N1) pdm 09 predominated. It 
was accompanied by a rapid growth of influenza morbidity with a significant increase of both 
hospitalization and mortality. The new pandemic virus displaced the previous seasonal A(H1N1) 
virus completely. As a rule, most of the influenza viruses circulating in Russia were antigenic ally 
related to the strains recommended by WHO for vaccine composition for the Northern hemisphere 
with the exception of two seasons when an unexpected replacement of the influenza B Victoria 
lineage by Yamagata lineage (2007–2008) and the following return of Victoria lineage viruses 
(2008–2009) was registered. Influenza surveillance in Russia was improved as a result of 
enhancing capacity to international standards and the introduction of new methods in NICs such as 
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rRT-PCR diagnosis, regular testing of influenza viruses for susceptibility to antivirals, 
phylogenetic analysis as well as organization of sentinel surveillance in a number of Regional 
Base Laboratories. Improvements promoted rapid recognition of the appearance a new pandemic 
virus in the country and enhancement of confirmation tests in investigation of influenza related 
death cases.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Investigation of regular trends for influenza virus evolution and influenza morbidity control 
activities are based on influenza monitoring data, analysis of influenza virus antigenic 
properties, genetic indicators for pathogen city, mutations appearing within the influenza 
virus genome, susceptibility of the circulating viruses to the current antiviral drugs, as well 
as population immunity status. Characterization of circulating influenza viruses is essential 
to predicting future epidemics/pandemics and to address practical public health challenges, 
such as updating the composition of influenza vaccines for the upcoming epidemic seasons. 
The main goal of the Russian influenza surveillance system is to provide a national picture 
of influenza activity in the country. The most important tasks of the surveillance include: 
monitoring the timing of influenza activity country-wide; characterizing viruses (type, 
subtypes), responsible for Influenza-Like Illnesses (ILI) and Acute Respiratory viral 
Infection (ARI) increases; monitoring antigenic changes in circulating influenza viruses; 
tracking of ILI/ARI in different age groups; determining the intensity and geographic spread 
of influenza; determining hospitalizations; registration and analysis of influenza associated 
Severe Acute Respiratory Illness (SARI) and deaths; determining risk groups for SARI 
development and lethal outcomes.
2. MATERIALS AND METHODS
2.1. The Organizational Structure of Influenza Surveillance in Russia
Human influenza surveillance in Russia is conducted by the two WHO National Influenza 
Centers (NIC) in St. Petersburg at the Research Institute of Influenza (RII) and in Moscow 
at the D.I. Ivanovsky Institute of Virology (IIV) under the Ministry of Public Health of the 
Russian Federation (MoH). According to the Order of the Federal Service for Customers’ 
Rights Protection and Human Well-Being Surveillance (Rospotrebnadzor) both RII and IIV 
are assigned a status of Reference Centers for Influenza Monitoring, tasked with diagnostic 
confirmation especially for lethal cases, virus identification and antigenic analysis. In 
addition, the WHO NIC at RII also named as the Federal Influenza Center serves and 
analyzes epidemiological data on morbidity, hospitalization and death cases sent by 49 
Regional Bases (RB), entities which are located in different cities of the Russian Federation, 
accomplish functions of state sanitary-epidemiological surveillance and conduct local 
management for Rospotrebnadzor. The WHO NIC at IIV as the Center of Ecology and 
Epidemiology of Influenza obtains the analogous data from 10 additional RBs. This data is 
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forwarded to the WHO NIC at RII, for processing consolidated data for Russia and 
preparation of consolidated weekly reports for influenza activity and forwards them to MoH, 
Rospotrebnadzor and back to RBs. Simultaneously data are introduced into the Flu Net and 
Euro Flu electronic Databases (EDB). Weekly influenza reports are also placed on the RII 
official website (www.influenza.spb.ru).
Collection of information on clinically-diagnosed influenza and ARI morbidity and relevant 
hospitalizations between 2005 to 2012 was conducted for age groups 0–2, 3–6, 7–14 and 15 
years and older. Separate registration for ILI and ARI cases was introduced since the 2005–
2006 influenza season. An automated Web-based data reporting system via the Internet from 
RBs to RII was developed and implemented in 2009. Intracity information was conducted 
by e-mail. Epidemic thresholds for each of 59 Russian cities under surveillance were 
determined using morbidity data for the previous 10-year period (from 1994 to 2004) both 
for the whole population and for each of the above indicated age groups.
To adapt to the European surveillance system, weekly influenza and ARI morbidity analysis 
by age groups conventionally used in Europe (0–4, 5–14, 15–64, 65 years and older) as well 
as of influenza intensity, trends and geographic spread in each of 7 Federal Districts of 
Russia was added to the surveillance system of Russiasince 2009. In collaboration with and 
support of the WHO Regional Office for Europe an influenza morbidity baseline for Russia 
was calculated and used for analysis of influenza seasons in Russia since the 2010–2011 
season.
2.2. Structure of Routine Epidemiological Surveillance
In Russia, ILI and ARI surveillance are on the list of notifiable conditions required to be 
reported by ambulatory or hospital physicians for primary visits of patients for medical care. 
No standardized case definition for SARI and ILI/ARI was used in the traditional 
surveillance system. ILI diagnosed by servicing clinicians on the following symptoms: 
Increased body temperature, headache, myalgia or weakness and one or more of 3 
respiratory symptoms such as cough, sore throat or shortness of breath. The data on ILI and 
ARI morbidity are accumulated in the local medical centers-Rayon Outpatient Clinics 
(ROC). Weekly data from ROCs are sent to a local Federal Budget Organization “Center for 
Hygiene and Epidemiology” where data from all ROCs of a city are aggregated and sent to 
the appropriate RB. Accumulated morbidity and mortality data are submitted by RBs to RII 
not later than Monday of a following week. RII accumulates and analyzes the weekly data 
obtained from the RBs each Tuesday and sends the resulting report to Rospotrebnadzor and 
the Ministry of Healthcare of the Russian Federation. Integrated weekly analysis of 
laboratory surveillance, epidemiological and sentinel surveillance data are directed to these 
authorities each Wednesday during the influenza season.
2.3. Morbidity Index and Analysis
Morbidity index is calculated as number of all clinically diagnosed both outpatients and 
inpatients with ILI and ARI per 10 000 population of each age group. Growth rate in percent 
is determined by the formula: (AB)/Bx100, where A-morbidity for analyzed week, B-
morbidity for previous week.
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ILI and ARI morbidity data () entered by RBs into RII electronic databases and analyzed 
automatically by the RII. Data for each of 59 cities are compared with weekly epidemic 
thresholds and with morbidity data for the previous week to determine the percent increase 
in morbidity.
2.4. Lethality Index
Is calculated as a percent of laboratory-confirmed influenza-related deaths among inpatients 
(mainly) and outpatients in each age group from the number of ARI&ILI patients for an 
analyzed age group.
2.5. Criteria Determining the Start of an Influenza Epidemic
Exceeding (higher than 20%) the influenza epidemic thresholds accompanied by an increase 
of weekly morbidity growth rates and laboratory detection of influenza cases are recognized 
as the main criteria of the beginning of the influenza epidemic period. For evaluation of the 
clinical severity of influenza epidemic hospitalization rates for whole epidemic period are 
determined by the formula: C/Dx100, where C is the number of hospitalized patients with 
influenza diagnosis, D is the number of hospitalized patients with influenza and ARI 
diagnosis in total. Etiology of the epidemic and its spread throughout Russia is determined 
based on the results of integrating morbidity and laboratory data.
2.6. The Main Components of Influenza Surveillance
WHO NICs in Russia use a multiple component national surveillance system for influenza 
that includes laboratory virological data, registration of ILI and ARI and hospitalization and 
mortality data mainly for the period from October to May. This period is extended to include 
the period from June to September in the case of the emergence of a new pandemic virus. In 
addition, the sentinel surveillance system for Severe Acute Respiratory Infection (SARI) 
among hospitalized patients and ILI/ARI among outpatients was organized. It was 
conducted in 9 RBs located in different Federal Districts of Russia in 2010–2011 season to 
determine risk groups and factors complicating influenza infection. Laboratory surveillance 
includes a number of components such as virus isolation, antigenic and genetic analysis, 
testing for susceptibility of new isolates to antiviral drugs (oseltamivir, zanamivir, 
rimantadine) and laboratory diagnosis tests using rRT-PCR and Immune Fluorescent Assay 
(IFA).
2.7. Sentinel Surveillance (SS)
“Methodological Recommendations for Sentinel Hospital Based Laboratory and 
Epidemiological Surveillance for Influenza” were developed in accordance with “WHO 
Regional Office for Europe Guidelines for Influenza Surveillance in Humans” (2009) by the 
WHO NIC at RII and approved by Rospotrebnadzor in 2009. This highly specific separate 
case-based surveillance was organized and introduced in 9 of 59 RBs since the 2010–2011 
season with the aim of more detailed analysis of clinical peculiarities of influenza in 
dependence of etiology, concomitant somatic pathology, pregnancy, previous vaccination, 
antiviral treatment. A total 18 hospitals and 12 ambulatory care clinics participated in SS. 
rRT-PCR exclusively was used for influenza diagnosis in SS.
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2.8. Case Definition of SARI and ILI Standardized in Sentinel Surveillance System (SS)
SARI diagnosis (with onset of illness during the previous 7 days that results in 
hospitalization) was used for analysis in SS system exclusively. Criterions for SARI in 
adults and children aged 5 years old and more included: fever >38°C and cough or sore 
throat and shortness of breath or difficulty breathing. Criterions for SARI in children less 
than 5 years old were breathing faster than 40 breaths min−1 (ages 1–5 years), faster than 50 
breaths min−1 (ages 2–12 months) and any of the following general danger signs such as 
unable to drink or breastfeed, vomits, convulsions, lethargic or unconscious, chest in 
drawing or stridor in a calm child. In SS system ILI diagnosed in a person with sudden onset 
of fever >38°C and cough or sore throat in the absence of other diagnosis. ARI diagnosed in 
a person with sudden onset and at least one of the following four respiratory symptoms: 
cough, sore throat, shortness of breath, coryza and a clinician’s judgment that the illness is 
due to an infection.
2.9. Determination of Virus Susceptibility to Antivirals
Susceptibility to oseltamivir carboxyl ate was conducted in NICs by measuring activity of 
neuraminidase in the reaction with a fluorogenic substrate (WHO, 2011) and RFLP test 
(Guo et al., 2009). Testing the inhibition of virus reproduction in MDCK cells in the 
presence of rimantadine was employed as well (Smee et al., 2009). Molecular genetic 
analysis of NA and Mgenes was conducted to detect amino acid substitutions responsible for 
the appearance of drug-resistant variants: viruses resistant to oseltamivir and rimantadine 
respectively.
2.10. Sending Isolates to WHO CCs
To improve global surveillance for influenza a total of 27 to 193 representative Russian 
strains and influenza virus drift variants were sent every year by the two NICs to the WHO 
CC in Atlanta, USA (751 viruses for the 7 years period). Between 23 and 87 additional 
influenza strains per year (367 viruses for the whole period) were forwarded by RII to the 
WHO CC in London, UK.
2.11. Population Immunity Investigation
Is conducted in the Regional Virological Laboratories (RVL) of RII in accordance with the 
Order of Rospotrebnadzor #373 as of March 31, 2005 “On Improvement of the 
Epidemiological Surveillance and Control of Influenza and Acute Respiratory Viral 
Infections”. Analysis of 100 sera obtained from healthy adult blood donors aged 18–63 
years in the pre-epidemic (in October) and post-epidemic (in April) periods are performed in 
RVLs each year. All results are sent to the NIC at RII to determine Geometric Mean Titers 
(GMT) of antibodies and Percent of Positive Humans (PPH) with antibody HI titer 1:32 or 
greater to seasonal influenza A (H1N1), (H1N1) pdm 09 (since the season 2009–2010), 
A(H3N2) and to influenza B viruses. Virus antigens used were inactivated and were 
antigenically like the strains recommended to be included in influenza vaccine composition 
for the respective seasons. Simultaneously, PPH and GMT to the viruses antigenic ally 
related to causative agents of previous pandemics, such as A/swine/Iowa/15/30 (Hsw1N1), 
A/Singapore/1/57(H2N2) were determined. Reassortant vaccine strain NIBRG-14 
Anna et al. Page 5













containing HA of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus A/Vietnam/1194/04 (H5N1) with 
deleted polybasic amino acid sequence was also used in population immunity investigations.
2.12. Virological Surveillance
Virus isolation was conducted by WHO NICs using MDCK cells and chicken embryos in 
parallel. In RVLs virus isolation was performed in MDCK cells only. Standard operating 
procedures were followed as published in Methodological recommendations “Influenza 
Virus Isolation in Cell Cultures and Chick Embryos and their Identification” prepared by 
WHO NICs in Russia (approved by Rospotrebnadzor in 2005). Briefly, nasal smears from 
the ILI and ARI patients suspended in transport medium (UTM-RT, Copan, USA) were used 
for infecting MDCK or MDCK/SIAT 1 cells grown in Eagle’s MEM with 5% of Fetal 
Bovine Serum (FBS) containing TPCK trypsin (2 μg mL−1). On the 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th 
days cells were examined using an inverted microscope (UNICO, USA) and if CPE was 
observed the medium was collected and used for HA detection and titration. PCR positive 
clinical samples and MDCK/SIAT1 cells were used since the season 2011–2012. The 
chicken embryos were infected by inoculation of clinical samples into both the amniotic and 
allantoic cavity. After 72 h of incubation at 34°C allantoic and amniotic fluids were sampled 
for HA determination. In the case of positive results the HA containing medium was divided 
into two parts: One was used for the second passage of the virus in chicken embryos or in 
MDCK cells and the second one was used for investigations and lyophilization. Negative 
samples were used for the second “blind” passage in both systems. WHO/CDC kits and 
immune rat sera to representative influenza strains prepared in NICs’ laboratories were used 
in the investigation of antigenic properties of influenza viruses isolated in Russia.
2.13. IFA Diagnosis
Methodological recommendations in “Rapid Diagnosis of Influenza and other ARI by 
Immunofluorescent Assay”, which had been approved by Rospotrebnadzor in 2005, were 
used as guidelines in IFA investigations conducted by RVLs. This includes direct 
investigation of acetone-fixed, pre-washed with PBS nasal epithelial cells taken from the 
ILI&ARI patients in the first 3 days of infection and stained with FITC-conjugated 
antibodies to contemporary influenza A(H1N1), A(H3N2) and B viruses (“Diagnostic 
Reagent Venture” at RII, St.-Petersburg, Russia).
1.14. rRT-PCR Diagnosis
Was introduced in RVLs since the 2008–2009 season. Investigation of clinical samples was 
conducted using instructions enclosed in “AmpliSense Influenza virus A/B-FL”, 
“AmpliSense Influenza virus A type FL” and “AmpliSense Influenza virus A/H1–swine-
FL” kits designed for the detection of influenza virus RNA types A and B, sub typing of 
seasonal influenza H1/H3 and for detection of influenza H1 pdm 09 virus respectively 
(FBUN “Central Institute of Epidemiology”, Moscow, Russia).
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3.1. Results of Influenza Epidemiological Surveillance
3.1.1. The Main Parameters of Epidemics and Morbidity Indices—During the 
period from 2005 to 2009 seasonal influenza epidemics of moderate intensity characterized 
by relatively low morbidity, hospitalization and lethality indices were registered annually 
(Fig. 1 and 2). During three seasons (2005–2006–2006–2007 and 2009–2010) influenza 
epidemics spread from the East to the West, but during four seasons (2007–2008–2008–
2009–2010–2011 and 2011–2012) epidemics were observed to move in two opposite 
directions (both eastwards and westwards). For example, during the 2007–2008 season 
influenza A(H1N1) virus first appeared in the West and subsequently spread to the East 
while influenza B virus spread concurrently from the East to the West. During the influenza 
season in 2008–2009, the influenza A(H3N2) epidemic moved from the West, while the 
influenza A(H1N1) epidemic started in the Eastern part of the country. The influenza 
pandemic A(H1N1) pdm 09 virus was detected for the first time in the Far East and from 
there spread to the cities of Siberia, Urals and later to the European part of the country. In 
the 2010–2011 season influenza A(H1N1) pdm 09 virus started to spread from the West, 
while influenza B activity was registered in the East of the country. In the past 7 years, the 
start of the epidemic influenza activity generally occurred during weeks 3–5. The 2009–
2010 season appeared to be an exception characterized by unusually early pandemic 
morbidity which registered in early October 2009 (Table 1).
The peak of morbidity was registered usually 5–7 weeks after the start of influenza activity 
followed by a gradual decrease of epidemic intensity to non-epidemic levels 6–9 weeks 
later. The weekly morbidity index at the peak of annual epidemics varied in the range from 
0.76 to 1.04% for the whole population, but it increased by 1.3–1.9 times during the two 
pandemic waves. Both morbidity indices and duration of the seasonal epidemic in different 
age groups showed the highest impacton children aged 0–2 and 3–6 years.
Median morbidity of ILI and ARI during the period of circulation of seasonal influenza 
A(H1N1), A(H3N2) and B viruses didn’t differ significantly, but became much higher 
during the pandemic period both for the whole population, school children of 7–14 years and 
groups of adults 15 years and older. At the same time, morbidity values in young children 
(0–2 and 3–6 years) were quite comparable with indices registered during seasonal 
epidemics (Fig. 3).
3.2. Hospitalization Indices
Annually during seasonal epidemics 69.6 to 86.7 thousand patients with «influenza» and 
«ARI» clinical diagnosis were hospitalized, during the first and second pandemic waves it 
increased up to 150.9 and 122.1 thousands. Influenza registered clinically among 
hospitalized patients with respiratory infections for the whole epidemic period varied 
between 1.3 and 5.4% but increased up to 14.1 and 12.9% during the seasons 2009–2010 
and 2010–2011. On the peak of two pandemic waves caused by influenza A(H1N1) pdm 09 
virus hospitalization index increased up to 18.5–23.0% from 2.9 to 8.5% during usual 
seasonal epidemics (Table 1).
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3.3. Influenza-Related Death Cases and Lethality
During the circulation of seasonal influenza viruses only a few influenza-related deaths (3–6 
cases per year) occurring mainly among young children and elderly persons were registered. 
During the first pandemic wave lethality due to influenza was found to increase sharply 
reaching 0.03% for the overall population (Table 1 and Fig. 2), the lowest lethality index 
(0.001%) was registered among children aged 3–6 years, this index was 2-fold higher among 
children aged 0–2 and 7–14 years; the highest lethality (0.06%) was registered among adult 
populations aged 15–64 years. The majority of deaths were registered at the peak of the 
season and during two subsequent weeks (weeks 47–49.2009). The percent distribution of 
all registered rRT-PCR confirmed influenza death cases by age groups (0–2, 3–6, 7–14, 15–
64 and ≥65 years) during the season 2009–2010 was estimated as 1.4, 1.4, 1.8, 92.8 and 
2.4%, respectively. Risk factors for influenza-related deaths included underlying infections, 
chronic diseases and pregnancy. Chronic hepatitis, pancreatitis and renal diseases were 
found in 8.3% of cases, cardiovascular pathology in 7.0%, immunodeficiency diseases in 
3.5%, endocrine dysfunctions in 3.7%, obesity in 6.7%, encephalopathy in 2.1% and 
pregnancy in 4.7%.
During the second pandemic wave (2010–2011) the lethality index for the total population 
was 10-fold lower (0.003%), including a 4.2-fold decrease among persons over 65 years and 
a 20-fold decrease among schoolchildren aged 7–14 years in comparison with season 2009–
2010. Changes in the age structure of deaths were found as well. The percent of influenza-
related deaths increased for children 0–2 years up to 2.3% and for adults ≥65 years up to 
8.3% but it decreased for schoolchildren from 1.8 to 1.1%. Meanwhile percent of deaths for 
the group 15–64 years of age decreased slightly and was estimated as 86.6% of lethal cases.. 
Influenza death cases were registered more often among patients with such underlying 
conditions as encephalopathy and organic brain lesions (increased 5.8-fold), endocrine 
dysfunctions and cardiovascular pathology (increased 3.9-fold);, chronic diseases of the 
respiratory tract (increased 3-fold), hepatitis, pancreatitis and renal diseases (increased 2.3-
fold) and immunodeficiency diseases (increased 1.9-fold.
3.4. Etiological Monitoring of Influenza
During recent years regular isolation of seasonal influenza viruses usually started by weeks 
3–4 of January and rarely began earlier in December. All the epidemics in seasons 2005–
2006 to 2008–2009 had mixed etiology associated with co-circulation of influenza 
A(H1N1), A(H3N2) and B viruses with a prevalence of influenza A(H3N2) virus in 2005–
2006 and 2011–2012 seasons (Table 2). Seasonal influenza A(H1N1) or influenza B viruses 
were secondary in the frequency of isolation for the period from 2005–2006 to 2008–2009. 
Thus, in the pre-pandemic period alternation in intensity of circulation of influenza seasonal 
A(H1N1) and B viruses with a prevalence of A(H3N2) viruses in some seasons was 
registered (Fig. 4 and 5). The situation changed sharply with the emergence of influenza 
A(H1N1) pdm 09 virus. The first case of the pandemic virus isolation was registered in May 
2009 at the WHO NIC in Moscow (Lvov et al., 2009) and later in WHO NIC in St.-
Petersburg.
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During the spring and summer months A(H1N1) pdm 09 was detected by rRT-PCR 
sporadically in ILI cases mostly in passengers arriving from affected countries. A sharp 
increase in the number of diagnosed influenza A(H1N1) pdm 09 cases accompanied by 
growth of epidemic morbidity was observed in October 2009 (Fig. 4–6). This rapid rise in 
cases was seen first in the cities of the Far East with spread of the pandemic virus toward the 
West through Siberia and the Urals to the European part of the country. In November–
December the majority of Russian cities appeared to be affected by the pandemic with an 
unusually high increase of influenza morbidity and mortality. Both virus isolation and rRT-
PCR data indicated exclusive circulation of the pandemic virus during this time. By the end 
of December and particularly after two weeks of the New Year and Christmas vacations, the 
rate of pandemic virus diagnosis and associated morbidity began to decrease. Influenza B 
virus appeared and circulated with moderate intensity during the winter and part of the 
spring. It is interesting that as in the previous pandemics the new influenza A(H1N1) pdm 
09 virus completely supplanted seasonal influenza A(H1N1) virus circulating earlier (Pica et 
al., 2012).
However, influenza A(H3N2) viruses, as occurred in pandemic 1977, retained their 
epidemic activity and caused epidemics in the next season in North American countries 
(USA, Canada) (CDCP, 2011). On the contrary, in Russia and most countries of the 
European region the 2010–2011 epidemic season was mainly caused by the pandemic 
virus(second pandemic wave) and A(H3N2) activity didn’t increase again in these countries 
until the 2011–2012 season, when the epidemic was of low intensity. This was partly due to 
population immunity status. Studies established that 66–68% of adults in different regions of 
Russia had protective levels of immunity to seasonal influenza A(H1N1), A(H3N2) and B 
viruses in October 2009, but only 10.1% were positive to influenza A(H1N1) pdm 09 virus 
(Table 3). During the next year as a result of natural widespread influenza A(H1N1) pdm 09 
virus circulation and vaccination of the population, immunity increased up to 36.2% in 
October 2010, but didn’t achieve the level typical for immunity against seasonal influenza 
viruses. This contributed to the development of the second pandemic wave. As a result, 
further increase of population immunity to the pandemic virus (54.3% of population 
acquired protective titers of antibody by April 2011) was registered. A decrease of immunity 
to influenza A(H3N2) virus which didn’t circulate during the two previous seasons was 
found in October 2011 (geometric mean titers decreased from 43 to 35.3 and the percent of 
people with protective titers of antibody decreased from 68 to 58%). This decrease in 
immunity in H3N2, promoted reappearance in circulation of influenza A(H3N2) viruses 
throughout the country. Low epidemic activity of influenza virus A(H1N1) pdm 09 in the 
2011–2012 season was observed. However, it should be noted that intensity of morbidity 
caused by influenza A(H3N2) virus this season was significantly lower than in all previous 
seasons of the pre-pandemic period.
3.5. Antigenic analysis of the Russian isolates
For all seven years reported, the WHO NIC at RII continued to isolate influenza viruses both 
in MDCK and chicken embryos routinely. Three influenza A viruses (H1N1, H1N1 pdm 09, 
H3N2) and influenza B of two lineages (Yamagata and/or Victoria) circulated during five 
epidemics and two pandemic waves for the reported period.
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3.6. Influenza A(H1N1) Viruses
Influenza A(H1N1) viruses were isolated in MDCK cells and chicken embryos as well. For 
the 2007–2008 season 82.6% of strains were isolated in eggs or in parallel in eggs and 
MDCK cells. The proportion of epidemic H1N1 strains varied from 12 to 37% in the pre-
pandemic period. Since the 2009–2010 pandemic season H1N1 seasonal viruses disappeared 
from circulation and were replaced by the pandemic strain (Table 2). Antigenic analysis 
showed that Russian strains followed the general global trend in evolution: New Caledonia/
20/99→SolomonIslands/03/06→Brisbane/59/07→Hong Kong/1870/08. However, in the last 
three years of circulation influenza A(H1N1) viruses evolved more actively than in the 
previous period and formed 2–3 antigenic ally distinct groups each season (Konovalova et 
al., 2010).
3.7. Pandemic Influenza 3(H1N1) pdm 09 Viruses
The first pandemic influenza A(H1N1) pdm 09 viruses were isolated in May–July 2009 
from patients arriving from the USA and Spain. However, regular isolation of viruses began 
in October 2009 and lasted until April 2010. The isolation of influenza A(H1N1) pdm 09 
viruses in eggs was more efficient than in MDCK cells, especially in autopsy sample 
investigations.
For antigenic analysis of pandemic viruses antis era to influenza A/California/07/09(H1N1) 
pdm 09, A/St.-Petersburg/56/09 (H1N1) pdm 09, A/New Jersey/8/76 (Hsw1N1), A/swine/
1976/31(Hsw1N1) and A/swine/Iowa/30 (Hsw1N1) strains were prepared at RII. All new 
strains isolated in Russia antigenic ally were A/California/07/09-like. No specific antigenic 
changes were detected among viruses isolated from autopsy or clinical materials. Only two 
strains from the total number of viruses isolated were evaluated as drift-variants of A/
California/07/09 because of a decreased level of interaction with specific antibodies. 
Interestingly pandemic isolates reacted with antis era to viruses such as A/New/Jersey/8/76, 
A/swine/1976/31, A/Iowa/15/30 to¼ or 1/8 of homologous titers and for some viruses even 
to 1/2 of initial titer. In the 2010–2011 epidemic season most (53%) of the isolates formed a 
homogenous group of A/California/07/09-like viruses that reacted with antis era to A/St.-
Petersburg/56/09 and to A/South Carolina/20/10 up to 1-1/2 of homologous titer as well. No 
specific antigenic changes were detected among isolates of influenza A(H1N1) pdm 09 virus 
from of the 2011–2012 season.
3.8. Influenza A(H3N2) Viruses
For the described period all Russian influenza A(H3N2) viruses were isolated only in 
MDCK cells because H3N2 viruses became much more difficult to isolate in embryonated 
hen’s eggs. In the 2005/2006 epidemic season when 57% of the strains were of influenza 
A(H3N2) virus subtype no significant antigenic drift was found and only slightly reduced 
relationships with isolates of the previous years were observed. Russian strains reacted well 
with antisera to the reference strain A/Wisconsin/67/05 and to the local representative virus 
A/St.-Petersburg/71/07. In the 2006–2007 season influenza A(H3N2) viruses were estimated 
at 41% of all strains isolated in Russia and again with no significant antigenic changes. In 
the 2007–2008 season the proportion of influenza A(H3N2) viruses decreased and they were 
more heterogeneous in antigenic properties. About 40% of the isolates acquired 
Anna et al. Page 10













characteristics of the new reference strain A/Brisbane/10/07 and the other group of viruses 
interacted in low HI titers both with antisera to the new and to the previous reference and 
circulating epidemic strains. Circulation of these viruses continued in the next (2008–2009) 
season when they accounted for 49% of all isolates. Most viruses proved to be drift-variants 
of the reference strain A/Brisbane/10/07. However, about 30% of the characterized strains 
interacted with this antiserum to the lower titer. During the first pandemic wave in the 2009–
2010 season, H3N2 subtype practically disappeared from circulation in Russia and only 7% 
of viruses were H3N2 during the second pandemic wave in 2010–2011. In the 2011–2012 
season influenza A(H3N2) virus which returned to circulation became the dominant strain 
(66% of all isolates). A majority of the viruses interacted with antiserum to the reference 
strain A/Perth/16/09 and other isolates reacted with antisera to viruses of Perth-like group to 
low titers and were closer in antigenic properties to A/Victoria/210/09. All of the viruses 
reacted with ferret antiserum to the new reference strain A/Victoria/361/11 but only to 
1/8-1/16 titers with rat antiserum to this new virus recommended to be included in the 
influenza vaccine composition for the 2012–2013 season. Nevertheless, the majority of 
Russian isolates reacted most effectively (up to 1/2 of homologous titer) with antiserum to 
the A/St.-Petersburg/10/12 strain (which was representative for the Russian isolates) and 
with WHO/CDC diagnostic serum to influenza A(H3N2) virus. We found only a slight and 
gradual antigenic drift until 2011–2012 when more evolution among influenza A(H3N2) 
viruses circulating in Russia occurred.. During the period studied, Russian H3N2 viruses 
generally compared well with the viruses adopted by WHO experts as the reference strains: 
A/Wisconsin/67/05→A/Brisbane/10/07→drift variants of A/Brisbane/10/07→A/Perth/16/09 
(A/Wisconsin/15/09, A/Victoria/208/09) →A/Victoria/361/11.
3.9. Influenza B viruses
During the study period influenza epidemics in the Russian Federation were characterized 
by regular circulation of influenza B viruses during the epidemic periods. It is important to 
note that influenza B viruses, unlike influenza A(H3N2) viruses, maintained their capability 
to replicate effectively not only in MDCK cells but in chicken embryos as well. This is an 
important trait in terms of strain selection for influenza vaccines (Ivanova et al., 2011).
All influenza B strains isolated during the 2005–2006 season belonged to the Victoria 
lineage and formed an antigenic ally homogenous group. Viruses interacted to 1-1/2 of 
homologous titers with antiserum to the reference strain B/Malaysia/2506/04 which was 
recommended for inclusion in influenza vaccines for the Northern hemisphere 2006–2007 
season.
In the 2006–2007 season both Victoria and Yamagata influenza B lineages circulated in 
Russia, though Yamagata lineage strains were isolated rarely and only in two cities. All 
influenza B viruses of Victoria lineage were antigenic ally similar to the influenza B/
Malaysia/2506/04 virus. Only 4 viruses which belonged to the Yamagata lineage and were 
B/Florida/07/04-like viruses. In the 2007–2008 season the situation changed radically. 
Yamagata lineage predominated throughout the epidemic season and all the viruses isolated 
in this period were antigenic ally related to B/Florida/07/04 virus with the exception of two 
Victoria-like B viruses which were isolated in late May 2008 and were similar to B/
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Malaysia/2506/04. The re-emergence of Victoria viruses at the end of epidemic season 
indicated that they could be the causative epidemic agents next season. Indeed, in 2008–
2009 only B-Victoria like viruses spread in Russia. This season was characterized by an 
antigenic drift of influenza B virus which wasn’t evident earlier. Viruses didn’t react with 
antiserum to the reference strain B/Malaysia/2506/04 or to B/Fujian-Gulou/1272/08 and 
were reactive specifically with antiserum to the B/Brisbane/60/08 strain.
After the pandemic of the 2009–2010 season in March–May, 2010 a number of influenza B 
viruses were isolated. Most of them were B/Brisbane/60/08-like. Surprisingly, it was found 
that few isolates reacted with antisera to B/Fujian-Gulou/1272/08 and B/Malaysia/2506/04 
which was different from observations in viruses during the previous season. In the 2010–
2011 season influenza B appeared in circulation earlier than usual (in December 2010) and 
all of them belonged to the Victoria lineage and were similar to the reference strain B/
Brisbane/60/08. In the 2011–2012 season simultaneous circulation of Yamagata and 
Victoria lineage viruses was observed in Russia (21.2 and 78.8% of all influenza B isolates, 
respectively) as in other countries of the Europe. Victorian strains were B/Brisbane/60/08-
like and Yamagata strains were antigenic ally related to B/Bangladesh/3333/07 or B/
Wisconsin/01/10 viruses.
3.10. Determination of Virus Susceptibility to Antivirals for 7-years Period
Monitoring circulating influenza viruses’ susceptibility to oseltamivir, zanamivir and 
rimantadine is an important part of influenza surveillance and necessary for understanding 
the global spread of strains resistant to antivirals. These data guide recommendations for 
influenza treatment.
Testing of viruses for susceptibility to antivirals indicated a gradual growth in the percent of 
rimantadine resistant influenza A(H3N2) viruses during the reported period which reached 
90–100% during the last four seasons. A low percent of viruses were resistant to oseltamivir. 
For seasonal influenza A(H1N1) viruses, an increased proportion of oseltamivir resistant 
strains was observed during the 2006–2007 and 2008–2009 influenza seasons, after which 
this virus disappeared from circulation. All tested pandemic influenza A(H1N1) pdm09 
viruses isolated since the 2009–2010 and 2011–2012 seasons appeared to be resistant to 
rimantadine but susceptible to oseltamivir and zanamivir (Table 4).
3.11. Primary Results of Sentinel Surveillance in RUSSIA for the Period Since the 2010–
2011 to 2011–2012 Seasons
The traditional system of influenza surveillance is not comprehensive and does not provide 
information about the causes of severe influenza or clinical course in humans and the impact 
of specific prevention and antiviral treatment options. In order to enhance surveillance since 
2010, the traditional system was supplemented by sentinel sites and laboratory Surveillance 
(SS) adopted in the WHO European Region system (WHO, 2009). Since the 2010–2011 
season SS was introduced in 9 geographically distant cities of the Russian Federation. The 
sites provide laboratory analysis of materials from patients hospitalized with severe 
influenza (SARI) as well as in outpatient ILI and ARI cases, followed by detailed 
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anamnestic data for age, concomitant diseases, status of influenza vaccination and prior 
antiviral therapy.
The analysis of the etiology of morbidity in these groups of patients using rRT-PCR in the 
2010–2011 and 2011–12 epidemic seasons, showed laboratory diagnosis of influenza 
obtained in the SS system, to be comparable to the results of extended Traditional 
Etiological influenza Monitoring (TEM). In the 2010–2011 season the etiological structure 
of influenza as with SARI and ILI/ARI cases showed predominance of influenza A(H1N1) 
pdm 09 virus (in 65 and 61% cases, respectively), while influenza B was diagnosed less 
frequently (in 26 and 24%, correspondingly). During the influenza epidemic peak 2011–
2012 influenza A viruses caused 86% of SARI cases including 81% of A(H3N2) and 5% of 
A(H1N1) pdm 09 agents, whereas in ILI/ARI patients influenza A was diagnosed in 63% of 
cases. Influenza B virus was found less frequently in SARI (14% of cases) whereas in 
ILI/ARI patients influenza B was detected in 36% of cases.
The rate of laboratory-confirmed influenza in SS at the peak of the 2010–2011 influenza 
season reached up to 55.7% in SARI and to 45.3% in ILI/ARI cases and was slightly lower 
in the season 2011–2012 (50.0% in SARI and 35.0% in ILI/ARI cases). The number of 
patients with influenza among all SARI cases for the 2011–12 season was lower than in the 
epidemic of 2010–2011 (12 and 19% of patients, respectively).
Analysis of data on underlying conditions in influenza and non-influenza SARI cases, shows 
the significance of pregnancy and cardiovascular system diseases in the development of 
SARI. However among patients with SARI caused by influenza A virus in both epidemic 
seasons, regardless of virus subtype, pregnancy was the leading risk factor for SARI 
developing (23.7% in 2010–2011 and 32.2% in 2011–2012.). Cardiovascular diseases were 
documented in 4.7% and 5.5% of SARI cases in the 2010–2011 and 2011–2012 seasons, 
respectively (Fig. 7).
The proportion of SARI patients with confirmed influenza with concomitant diseases was 
much higher than non-influenza SARI patients (42 and 21% in 2010–2011, 32 and 11% in 
2011–2012, respectively). In both epidemic seasons a very small percentage (4%) of SARI 
patients with influenza was vaccinated and this suggest for increased risk of SARI 
development among unvaccinated individuals.
4. DISCUSSION
The 7-year longitudinal study covers the pre-pandemic period (seasons from 2005–06 to 
2008–09), characterized by moderate influenza activity associated with co-circulation of 
influenza A(H1N1), A(H3N2) and B viruses in different proportions, two pandemic seasons 
(2009–10 and 2010–11) when influenza A(H1N1) pdm 09 dominated and caused unusually 
high morbidity and mortality in Russia, as well as one post-pandemic season (2011–12)with 
very low morbidity associated with influenza A(H3N2) and B viruses circulating. It is well 
known that the emergence of a new pandemic virus is unpredictable. The appearance of a 
new pandemic A(H1N1) pdm 09 virus in Mexico in 2009 was rather unexpected. Soon after 
isolation of the new triple reassortant influenza A(H1N1) pdm 09 virus in California (USA) 
and its identification in CDC (Atlanta, USA) it was established that the novel virus differed 
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significantly from circulating seasonal A(H1N1) viruses. In our investigations the antigenic 
properties of the emergent virus was found to be more closely related to A/swine/Iowa/
15/1930 and A/swine/1976/31 viruses which circulated in swine populations in the 1930s 
(after the severe “Spanish flu” pandemic in 1917–1918)as well as to the A/New Jersey/
07/1976 virus, which was the virus that caused an outbreak among military recruits in the 
USA in 1976. Thus, even though more than 90 years have passed since the emergence of 
viruses of the “Spanish flu” era, the hem agglutinin of those viruses and the strains of 
pandemic 2009 saved common antigenic determinants (Eropkin et al., 2011; Sominina et al., 
2011). The co-crystal structure of the 1918 hem agglutinin with 2D1, an antibody from a 
survivor of the 1918 Spanish flu, that neutralizes both 1918 and 2009 H1N1 viruses, reveals 
an epitope that is conserved in both pandemic viruses (Xu et al., 2010).
Great contribution to the development of the theory of pandemic influenza virus origin was 
made by Taubenberger et al. (2012) who reconstructed and investigated the “Spanish” virus 
after step-by-step recognition of its genome structure. As it was shown in the investigation 
of Sominina et al. (2011) the 1918 pandemic virus was genetically and antigenically most 
closely related to influenza virus A/swine/Iowa/15/1930.
It is appropriate to note that the emergence of the new A (H1N1) pdm09 virus conforms to 
the hypothesis of the academician Anatoly A. Smorodintsev regarding the high probability 
of reappearance of the “Spanish flu” virus in circulation among humans after a decrease of 
population immunity levels to this virus as a result of the decrease of the percent of elderly 
people with immunity to this virus (Smorodintsev, 1984). Many years of investigations 
performed by RII in collaboration with RVLs showed that the population immunity to 
influenza A/swine/Iowa/30 virus as well as to influenza A(H2N2) and A(H5N1) viruses 
became very low. After two pandemic waves population immunity to influenza A(H1N1) 
pdm 09 virus increased significantly while its decrease to influenza A(H3N2) resulted in 
spread of recent H3N2 virus in Russia during the 2011–2012 season.
The interesting question is why do the new pandemic viruses usually displace the preceding 
seasonal influenza A viruses from circulation? Pandemic influenza A(H1N1) pdm 09 virus 
spread led to the rapid disappearance of the seasonal A(H1N1) virus. One of the possible 
mechanisms could be associated with increased capacity of a newly emerging influenza 
virus for rapid transmission partly associated with low population immunity to this virus. 
Only 10.1% of the Russian population had protective antibody titers to the pandemic virus in 
October 2009. This is different from the seasonal A(H1N1) virus against which about 66% 
of population were protected. The data on low immunity level to influenza A(H1N1) pdm 09 
virus in the Russian population in 2009 is consistent with the data of Hancock et al. (2009) 
obtained in the USA. This gave the pandemic virus the advantage over the seasonal 
A(H1N1) virus to spread easily among humans with displacement of the latter from 
circulation. Capacity of influenza A(H3N2) virus to cause epidemics in the following 
seasons was preserved. It might be explained by published data indicating different 
evolutionary dynamics exhibited by influenza A(H1N1) and A(H3N2) viruses (Bhatt et al., 
2011).
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Comparative analysis of epidemics’ intensity and etiology for the seven years’ period 
indicated that the highest morbidity peaks were registered exactly in pandemic seasons 
2009–2010 (Karpova et al., 2010) and 2010–2011 and exceeding peak morbidity indices of 
those usually recorded during seasonal epidemics by 1.3–1.6 times. Sharp growth of 
hospitalization and mortality cases was recorded during the two consecutive pandemic 
waves as well.
As in other countries, the main causes of deaths associated with influenza appeared to be 
pregnancy, chronic cardiovascular and respiratory tract diseases and obesity. Changes in the 
age structure of morbidity and mortality were found during the pandemic as well. Different 
from seasonal epidemics, the highest morbidity level was registered among schoolchildren 
and socially active groups of employable populations.
Periodic substitution of influenza B viruses belonging to Victoria lineage by Yamagata 
lineage (2007–2008 season) and contrariwise (2008–2009) which was difficult to predict in 
time lead to challenges for determining vaccine strain composition for the Northern 
hemisphere. As indicated above, two seasons showed a mismatch of circulating influenza B 
viruses and the influenza B component of the vaccine. For this reason a number of vaccine 
manufacturers decided to produce tetra-vaccines including representatives of both 
contemporary lineages of influenza B virus starting with the 2012–2013 season.
Introduction of sentinel surveillance in Russia, in addition to routine epidemiological 
approaches, yielded new results regarding the percent of influenza associated SARI cases 
where influenza A virus subtype dominated in etiology of morbidity during epidemics. It is 
interesting that during the 2011–12 season when influenza A(H3N2) predominated the 
number of patients with influenza among all SARI cases was lower than in the second wave 
of influenza pandemic 2010–2011 (12 and 19% of patients, respectively).. These 
investigations also showed an increased threat of severe influenza development among 
pregnant women and evidence to include them as a risk group for vaccination. In addition, 
results of sentinel surveillance showed that only 4% of patients in influenza associated SARI 
cases were vaccinated. According to the official data of Rospotrebnadzor (Press-release: 
“On the course of influenza vaccination in the Russian Federation and the incidence of 
influenza and ARI” from 12.12.2012) “The total number of vaccinated against influenza is 
more than 36.3 million people (25.4% of the total population).” This supports the 
importance of vaccination for priority groups of risk, which in this investigation were 
determined as pregnant women and patients with cardiovascular and chronicle lung diseases.
5. CONCLUSION
In 2009, the world saw the unexpected emergence of influenza A(H1N1) pdm09 virus in 
North American countries (Mexico, USA) followed by the rapid development of a global 
pandemic. In Russia the first pandemic wave was characterized by rapid growth of 
morbidity with an unusually high level of hospitalization and mortality. The pandemic 
followed four seasons of usual moderate influenza activity associated with circulation of 
seasonal influenza A(H1N1), A(H3N2) and B viruses. The pandemic started in Russia 
during week 40. 2009 with sporadic cases of illness caused by A(H1N1) pdm09 virus among 
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people arriving from affected countries were the pandemic beganin May–June 2009. A 
second pandemic wave developed as usual for seasonal epidemics during winter 2010, with 
the level of morbidity and mortality below that documented during the first pandemic wave. 
Decreased morbidity and mortality was associated with a rise in population immunity.
Analysis of antigenic and genetic properties of influenza viruses circulating in Russia during 
the period 2006–2012 showed the relation to the strains recommended by WHO for vaccine 
composition for the Northern hemisphere with the exception of two seasons when an 
unexpected replacement of the influenza B viruses of Victoria lineage by Yamagata lineage 
(2007–2008) and vice versa was observed. The enhancement of influenza surveillance in 
Russia was a result of the wide introduction of rRT-PCR diagnosis, regular testing of 
influenza viruses for susceptibility to antivirals, phylogenetic analysis as well as 
organization of sentinel surveillance in a number of Regional Base Laboratories. 
Improvements promoted the rapid recognition of the introduction of the new pandemic virus 
in the country and enhancement of laboratory confirmation tests enabled the determination 
of influenza associated risk groups for SARI and fatal cases.
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Comparative data on structure of underlying conditions in influenza and non-influenza SARI 
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